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BOOK REVIEWS
AN ACCESSIBLE WINDOW INTO CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT
Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. The Science of Military Strategy. Beijing: Military Science Publishing
House, 2005. 504pp. $40
This first English-language volume on
strategy by China’s People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was translated by a team of
experts at the Academy of Military Sci-
ences from the original Chinese-language
version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by
two major generals with significant
ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers
to China’s powerful Central Military
Commission (CMC) and Politburo
Standing Committee, this volume un-
doubtedly reflects elements of critical
policy trends in Beijing and hence mer-
its close examination by foreign re-
searchers and policy makers. Since this
book has deliberately been made acces-
sible to an overseas audience, it is im-
portant to reflect on what message its
English-language publication may be
intended to convey.
The 2001 Chinese-language version is
used to educate senior PLA decision
makers, including those on the CMC, as
well as officers who may become China’s
future strategic planners. Now in its
fourth printing, it can be read along
with a variety of other texts, such as the
more operationally and tactically fo-
cused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue),
published by China’s National Defense
University in 2000, the better to under-
stand actual PLA doctrine. The closest
U.S. equivalent to these volumes collec-
tively might be Doctrine for Joint Opera-
tions (Joint Publication 3-0).
Part One surveys China’s historical ex-
perience and development of military
theory. The authors describe the cur-
rent age as an “era of sea,” in which
maritime states, like their predecessors,
will employ Mahanian and other strate-
gies to “actively develop comprehensive
sea power” and “expand strategic depth
at sea.” Part Two offers Chinese per-
spectives on the laws and conduct of
war. Chapter 9, on “Strategic Deter-
rence,” deserves particular attention, as
it clearly provides a rationale for many
elements of the PLA’s modernization
program that have been overlooked by
many foreign analysts. Part Three ex-
amines future warfare and the implica-
tions for China, including recent PLA
experience and combat guidelines.
Throughout the volume, the continuing
relevance of the People’s War is empha-
sized as a foundation of Chinese mili-
tary strategy.
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It is this third section that will be of
greatest interest to Western scholars
seeking insights into PLA thinking
about China’s strategic situation. The
authors of this volume believe that
China, both a land and a sea power,
faces multifaceted strategic opportuni-
ties and challenges. Despite its eighteen-
thousand-kilometer coastline, China is
currently constrained by the world’s
longest island chain, centering on stra-
tegically, politically, and economically
vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from
China’s only disputed territory, how-
ever: “1,000,000 square kilometers” of
maritime territory, “one ninth of
China’s national land territory,” re-
mains under contention. The authors
also identify energy supply security as
critical to China’s national develop-
ment. Their statement that the South
China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves
equivalent to that of [the] Middle East”
conflicts with Western assessments,
however, leaving the reader wondering
about the true strategic underpinnings
of Beijing’s claims.
The authors foresee possible threats to
China’s “sovereignty, maritime rights,
and great cause of reunification,”
threats that, should all other measures
fail, may necessitate a defensive (and
therefore inherently just) war on
China’s “borderlines, seacoasts, and air
spaces.” The resulting “high-tech local
wars” may well require the PLA to con-
front a technologically superior adver-
sary. Accordingly, the authors suggest
emphasizing preemption; employment
of a broad spectrum of military tech-
nologies, including asymmetric “trump
card” weapons; and integration of civil-
ian and military forces in missions (e.g.,
“guerrilla warfare on the sea”) that in-
corporate political, economic, and legal
warfare. While this volume raises as
many questions as it answers, it is never-
theless a welcome contribution to a vi-




Howarth, Peter. China’s Rising Sea Power: The
PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge. New York:
Frank Cass, 2006. 198pp. $125
Peter Howarth, an Australian former
diplomat and intelligence analyst, pres-
ents an excellent mix of strategic the-
ory, political dynamics, and tactical
detail in considering the Chinese sub-
marine fleet. His treatment demon-
strates a keen understanding of both
parts of the phrase “politico-military
strategy,” and it is the type of thinking
that Jeffrey Record of the Air War Col-
lege recently opined is too often miss-
ing in the American community.
Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if
only because one gets to visit so many
old friends in strategic theory, such as
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett,
Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie,
Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René
Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and
Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tse-
tung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu.
Like so many others who write about
China’s navy since the fall of the Berlin
Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sen-
sational claims on the subject, presum-
ably thereby justifying the work and
attracting attention. However, what dis-
tinguishes Howarth from so many oth-
ers who have searched and found
reasons to be alarmed at the conven-
tional naval power of China is that he
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